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In the paper the impact of R&D cooperation on prices in experimen-
tal duopoly markets is examined. As a theoretical benchmark for
the experiment, a two-stage duopoly model with an R&D stage with
technological spillovers and a pricing stage is used. For two scenar-
ios of technological spillovers (no versus complete spillovers), a treat-
ment where it is possible to credibly commit to an R&D contract and
a baseline treatment without binding contract possibilities, are run.
Findings are that, in general, prices are between the subgame per-
fect Nash and the cooperative level. Further, for both spillover levels
prices are higher in periods where R&D contracts are committed to,
than in other periods, and to a lesser extent compared to the baseline
treatments.
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11 Introduction
To protect consumers, European and American antitrust laws forbid ¯rms
to engage in price collusion or in other explicit or implicit agreements that
restrict output and harm consumers. At the same time the formation of re-
search joint ventures or agreements that are related to cooperation in R&D
are not forbidden but rather encouraged by European and American govern-
ments because of their welfare-enhancing e®ects. A large strand of theoretical
literature based on the seminal paper of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)
has dealt with the comparison of outcomes of non-cooperative oligopoly R&D
games with cooperative R&D outcomes with possible technological spillovers
in a ¯rst stage and usually competition in the output stage. Examples are
Kamien et al. (1992); Leahy and Neary (1997); Petit and Tolwinski (1999);
Hinloopen (2000). The models are of a non-tournament kind. The main
¯nding is that if the spillover parameter lies above a threshold value, welfare
is higher when ¯rms cooperate in R&D compared to when they compete in
R&D, while it is the other way around for a spillover below the threshold
value. This result provides a rationale for governments to stimulate horizon-
tal R&D cooperation in industries with large technological spillovers. The
¯nding is based on the assumption that ¯rms engage either in Cournot or
Bertrand competition in the output market. An important question that has
mostly been neglected in this stream of literature is whether cooperation in
the R&D stage facilitates collusion in the output stage.
There have been some attempts in the theoretical literature to establish
a link between cooperation in the R&D stage and cooperation in the output
stage, though usually the frameworks that are used for this purpose are
somewhat di®erent from the one in the above mentioned strand of literature.
In Martin (1995) the e®ects of R&D joint ventures on the pervasiveness of
tacit collusion in the product market are examined in a patent race model
without technological spillovers. The author uses a non-cooperative game-
theoretic framework and assumes that ¯rms follow a trigger strategy with
product market collusion being an equilibrium strategy when the present
value of pro¯ts gained from colluding is larger than the present value of pro¯ts
gained from defecting. It is found that voluntarily forming an R&D joint
venture makes it more likely for tacit collusion to be sustained in the product
market. In Cabral (2000) interactions between R&D and price decisions are
examined in an in¯nite duopoly framework where ¯rms are to make R&D and
price decisions simultaneously. Only if R&D is successful, higher pro¯ts are
gained. The ¯ndings are that self-enforcing R&D agreements that increase
R&D towards an e±cient level decrease prices while R&D contracting results
in increased prices. Lambertini et al. (2002) examine the interplay between
2product R&D and pricing decisions in a non-cooperative framework and ¯nd
that independent ventures that lead to horizontal product di®erentiation
can facilitate price collusion. Finally, van Wegberg (1995) is based on an
extension of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) to a model with three ¯rms
and products that are imperfect substitutes. In the paper some speci¯c
cases are identi¯ed in which the formation of an R&D alliance of two out of
three ¯rms could lead to collusion in output in an in¯nitely repeated non-
cooperative game context. I am not aware of any empirical papers that deal
with the topic.
Examples of laboratory experiments where subjects were to make R&D
and price/quantity decisions are Isaac and Reynolds (1992) and Jullien and
Ru±eux (2001). The former builds on a stochastic invention model of inno-
vation, where the probability of producing a practically relevant innovation
depends on the amount of R&D investment of a ¯rm. The experimental
results give support to behavior that the authors classify as Schumpeterian
competition, which is characterised by a combination of engagement in costly
innovation and falling prices and by rising concentration. Oligopoly R&D
investment is generally lower than the social optimum, except in the last
periods, but it is unclear whether it is close to an equilibrium prediction.
In the experiments of Jullien and Ru±eux (2001), ¯rms could either adopt
an existing technology, that would reduce production costs in a known way,
or develop a new technology, with an uncertain outcome. They introduce
spillovers by letting R&D decisions of a ¯rm yield industry-wide cost re-
ductions with a time lag. It is found that market prices generally converge
towards their competitive level and that markets thus are e±cient. When
all oligopolists simultaneously gain a cost reduction that shifts the aggregate
supply curve downwards, adjustment of market prices to their new com-
petitive level is slower and bene¯ts of the innovations initially solely accrue
to producers. Uncertainty yields prices that are further away from equilib-
rium predictions and only R&D decisions with uncertainty are reduced by
spillovers.
Another set of R&D experiments is found in Suetens (2003a) and Suetens
(2003b), where the former includes a binding contract treatment and the
latter a non-binding communication treatment. In both papers, a two-stage
duopoly framework is used and it is assumed that in the second stage, ¯rms
are engaged in Cournot competition. As such, only R&D decisions, and
not quantity or price decisions are investigated. Findings are that either
without or with full technological spillovers, contracted R&D converges to
the cooperative level and R&D in the fully competitive game converges to
the subgame perfect Nash level. Non-binding communication leads to the
cooperative R&D level, only if technological spillovers are complete.
3In this paper an experiment is set up to examine whether in a non-
tournament duopoly framework with two stages, i.e. an R&D stage and a
pricing stage, R&D cooperation enhances price collusion. This approach is
novel in the sense that the relation between cooperation in the R&D stage
and cooperation in the output stage has not been examined in an exper-
iment before. Furthermore, we are not aware of any experimental papers
on R&D and pricing behavior that allow ¯rms to sign R&D contracts. In
part of the treatments subjects have the possibility to make binding R&D
agreements in the ¯rst stage and the rest of the treatments are simply base-
line treatments without any contract possibilities. Given the importance of
the level of technological spillovers in non-cooperative and cooperative R&D
literature and the di®erences in R&D behavior in a non-cooperative context
found in Suetens (2003b), a distinction is also made between a scenario with-
out spillovers and a scenario with full spillovers. The remainder of the paper
is organized as follows. In section 2 an overview is given of the theoretical
predictions of the non-cooperative and cooperative duopoly models. Section
3 describes the experimental design and procedure that has been followed.
Sections 4 and 5 analyze the experimental R&D decisions and prices respec-
tively and section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical predictions
The model that serves as a benchmark for the experiment is based on Kamien
et al. (1992) and d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)1. In the model two ¯rms
in duopoly sell di®erentiated products and face a linear inverse demand curve
of pi(qi;qj) = a ¡ bqi ¡ cqj, with i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j2. The ¯rms decide on
R&D investment in a ¯rst stage and make price decisions in a second stage.
Investing in R&D reduces unit production cost and has decreasing returns3.
It is further assumed that technological spillovers arise, such that e®ective
R&D investment of a ¯rm consists of its own R&D investment and a part of
the R&D of the competitor that has spilled over. Replacing quantities by the
direct demand curves yields the following pro¯t function of ¯rm i for i = 1;2
1Henceforth KMZ and AJ.
2The utility function that results in this set of demand curves for ¯rms i and j has a




(Singh and Vives, 1984; Hinloopen, 2000).
3For large spillovers, returns to e®ective R&D are increasing in the original AJ model,
but by using an alternative speci¯cation for the R&D cost function, this is avoided. See
Amir (2000) for a thorough comparison between AJ and KMZ.











where pi is the price of products of ¯rm i and xi the R&D investment of
¯rm i. ¯ represents the spillover parameter that lies between 0 and 1, ®
stands for unit production cost if no R&D is done by neither of the ¯rms
and the last term of the pro¯t function is the R&D cost function. As to
obtain decreasing returns to e®ective R&D and as such, equivalence between
results of the AJ and KMZ models, the suggestion of Amir (2000) to use a
steeper R&D cost function has been taken into account. In the R&D cost
function, ± = °(1 + ¯) where ° is the original AJ cost parameter. By using
this alternative cost function, equilibrium R&D predictions are those of KMZ
and decision variables in the ¯rst stage of the game are unit cost reductions as
in AJ4. The two-stage game is solved by backward induction. Since ¯rms are
not allowed to make binding agreements in the product market, the solution
concept of the second stage of the game is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Thus, pro¯t of ¯rm i with i = 1;2 is maximized with respect to its price.
This yields an equilibrium solution for the price of i, in terms of the R&D
decisions of both ¯rms, of
pi =
(2b + c)[a(b ¡ c) + ®b] ¡ b[(2b + ¯c)xi + (2b¯ + c)xj]
4b2 ¡ c2 : (2)
If ¯rms do not have the possibility to make binding agreements with re-
spect to their R&D investment in the R&D stage, this stage is also played
non-cooperatively. The solution concept is again subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium. Filling in the equilibrium prices (equation 2) in the pro¯t function
(equation 1) and maximizing the ¯rst-stage pro¯t function for both ¯rms
with respect to R&D yields the following (symmetric) R&D equilibrium5:
x
¤ =
2b(a ¡ ®)(2b2 ¡ b¯c ¡ c2)
(1 + ¯)[°(b + c)(2b + c)(2b ¡ c)2 ¡ 2b(2b2 ¡ b¯c ¡ c2)]
: (3)
If ¯rms are allowed to make binding R&D agreements and can reliably com-
mit to a cooperative R&D level, joint pro¯t is maximized with respect to
4In Amir (2000) this is proven for the case of quantity competition with homogenous
products, but it can be shown that the same conclusions are valid for price competition
with di®erentiated products.
5It is assumed that the second-order conditions and the stability conditions suggested
by Henriques (1990) are met.




2b(a ¡ ®)(b ¡ c)
°(b + c)(2b ¡ c)2 ¡ 2b(1 + ¯)(b ¡ c)
: (4)
The cooperative R&D level is larger (smaller) than the competitive R&D
level if actions in the R&D stage are strategic complements (substitutes), i.e.
if ¯>(<) bc
2b2¡c2. Pro¯t that corresponds to R&D cooperation is higher than
pro¯t under R&D competition if ¯ 6= bc
2b2¡c2.
Finally, another benchmark case is looked at, i.e. price collusion. If the
¯rms collude in prices, such that joint pro¯t is maximized, the following price
comes out for ¯rm i with i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j in terms of own R&D and
R&D of the other ¯rm:
pi =
a + ® ¡ (xi + ¯xj)
2
: (5)
Obviously, given the R&D decisions, the collusive price is higher than the
Nash level for all parameter values. If ¯rms expect to collude in the second
stage, their pro¯t to be maximized in the ¯rst stage is formulated in terms
of the collusive prices. This yields other predictions for the competitive and
cooperative R&D levels. These are respectively
x
¤ =
(a ¡ ®)[2b ¡ c(1 + ¯)]





2°(b + c) ¡ (1 + ¯)
: (7)
Based on the predictions of the model, the hypotheses to be tested ex-
perimentally are formulated. The main hypothesis is the following.
Hypothesis 1 Prices are at their subgame perfect Nash level, irrespective of
whether binding R&D agreements can be made.
Other theoretical predictions regarding R&D decisions are summarized in
the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2 If binding R&D agreements cannot be made, R&D invest-
ment is at its competitive level.
Hypothesis 3 If binding R&D agreements can be and are made, R&D in-
vestment is at its cooperative level.
6It is again assumed that second-order and stability conditions are met. Another
assumption is that the condition suggested by Salant and Sha®er (1998) is met such that
the cooperative R&D level is unique and symmetric.
63 Experimental procedure
The experiment was run at Tilburg University and consisted of six com-
puterized sessions with a total number of 114 recruited students7. Most
students were undergraduate economics students and participated before in
other experiments, but not in this kind of experiment. Each session lasted for
two hours and earnings were between 7 and 30 EUR. Before the experiment
started, instructions were handed out and the students had the opportunity
to ask questions in private. Treatments with and without a possibility to en-
gage in a binding R&D agreement (contract) with the other producer of the
same duopoly have been implemented for industries without technological
spillovers and industries with complete technological spillovers. As such, the
experiment consisted of four treatments, i.e. a treatment without contract
possibilities and a treatment with contract possibilities, both for ¯ = 0 and
¯ = 1 (henceforth T00, T10, T01 and T11, where the ¯rst dummy in the index
refers to the degree of spillover and the second to the contract possibility).
The number of students that participated in the treatments are 30 in T00, 22
in T10, 32 in T01 and 30 in T11, which corresponds to a total of 57 duopolies
of which 15 are in T00, 11 in T10, 16 in T01 and 15 in T11.
With respect to the choice of parameter values, we have tried to ensure
that the pro¯t increases that correspond to a price increase and a change in
R&D decision are `high enough'. But it is inherent to the model that the
relative change in pro¯t that results from a price change is much higher than
the pro¯t change that results from a change in R&D decision. Parameter
values that were used in the experiment are a = 245;® = 50;b = 5;c = 3:35
and ° = 0:96. Corresponding theoretical predictions and benchmarks are
in table 1. Turning from the individual pro¯t maximizing R&D level to the
joint pro¯t maximizing level yields a pro¯t increase of 3 to 9%, depending on
pricing behavior and the level of spillovers, while turning from the individual
to the joint pro¯t maximizing price yields a pro¯t increase of 29 to 39%,
depending on R&D behavior and the level of spillovers.
The instructions made clear that the subjects represented a seller/producer
of an unspeci¯ed product in a market with two sellers of a similar product and
that demand of consumers was simulated by the computer. They were told
that consumers buy more (less) of their product and less (more) of the prod-
uct of the other producer, the lower (higher) the prices of their product. In all
markets the simulated inverse demand curve was pi(qi;qj) = 245¡5qi¡3:35qj
yielding a demand curve of qi(pi;pj) ¼ 29:34¡0:36pi +0:24pj. The subjects
knew that the other seller in their market was subject to the same condi-
7The software z-Tree, developed by Fischbacher (1999), has been used.
7x¤ x¤¤ X¤ X¤¤ p¤ p¤¤ ¼¤ ¼¤¤
Price competition
¯ = 0 17.4 9.5 34.8 19.0 85.3 91.2 862.6 891.0
¯ = 1 4.8 10.0 9.6 20.0 91.2 83.3 913.8 936.8
Price collusion
¯ = 0 28.0 13.0 56.0 26.0 133.5 141.0 1112.1 1214.2
¯ = 1 6.5 13.9 13.0 27.8 141.0 133.6 1254.6 1300.7
Table 1: Theoretical benchmarks
tions. They were asked to make investment and price decisions in a ¯rst
and second stage respectively, during 40 rounds, of which the ¯rst 5 served
as practice rounds and were ignored when calculating ¯nal remunerations.
Investment had to be between 0.0 and 50.0 and the price between 0.0 and
245.0. Once an investment decision was made, it remained the same for ¯ve
periods, which implies that investment decisions only had to be made every
¯ve periods. In this way, subjects could better learn to make price decisions.
Price decisions had to be made in all 40 periods. When all investment deci-
sions were entered, subjects were informed about their own and the decision
of the other duopolist and the following stage started. When all price de-
cisions were entered, they were informed about the price decisions made in
that period and about (experimental) pro¯t of both. Remunerations were
calculated by dividing the sum of all earned pro¯ts during 35 rounds by 1500.
The subjects were told that after the practice rounds they were re-matched
with a di®erent partner that was ¯xed for the rest of the rounds, while actu-
ally they kept the same partner. Subjects had no knowledge of the identity
of their counterparts.
Subjects were explained that the investment reduced the cost of produc-
ing one unit of their product by the amount of the investment (and of the
unit production cost of the other producer in the same duopoly in the treat-
ments with complete spillovers) on the one hand and that it introduced a
cost of half of the square of the amount (the square of the amount in the
complete spillovers treatments)8 on the other hand. A pro¯t calculator was
always available where own pro¯t and pro¯t of the other duopolist could be
automatically calculated if ¯ctive values of investment and price decisions
were ¯lled in. All decisions of the previous period were also shown on the
screen. In the contract treatments an additional frame was shown on the
screen in which subjects could send a symmetric contract proposal to the
other player. The contract was binding in that once a contract was accepted,
8The parameter value of ° has been set to 0.96, such that ± ¼ 1 when no spillovers are
present and ± ¼ 2 for complete spillovers.
8both parties could not make another investment decision than the one agreed
on in the contract. It was stressed that once a proposal was sent, the sender
was committed to the proposal if the other player accepted the proposal, even
if other proposals were made. All contract proposals were numbered and if
a contract was accepted, the number of the accepted contract was shown on
the screen.
4 Prices
The analysis of the experimental data is split up in two parts. In this section
we look at price decisions and R&D decisions are dealt with in the next
section. Price decisions are considered ¯rst, since it is necessary to have
information on pricing behavior to be able to make conclusions regarding
R&D behavior. As decisions of a subject are not independent of decisions of
his/her counterpart, averages of price decisions and sums of R&D decisions
by duopoly are used in the data analysis. In the ¯rst subsection a descriptive
and a more conservative statistical analysis are concentrated on. The second
subsection contains an econometric analysis aimed at calculating long-term
equilibrium values of prices. Based on these long-term equilibrium prices,
conclusions regarding R&D decisions can be made.
4.1 Descriptive and statistical analysis
Averages of prices over all periods and over the last ten periods are in table
29. Within the contract treatment, a further distinction is made on the basis
of whether a contract has actually been chosen or not, which is represented
by a third index. Averages of prices in periods in which R&D contracts have
been committed to, are referred to as 0 in the third subscript and averages of
prices in periods without R&D contracts are referred to as 1. It is observed
that without spillovers, prices in the treatment with contract possibilities are
higher than prices in the treatment without contract possibilities. Further,
within the treatment without technological spillovers and with contract pos-
sibilities, prices in periods in which R&D contracts are actually committed to
are higher than in periods without R&D contracts. Prices with technological
spillovers are not that di®erent between the treatments without and with
contract possibilities and within the contract treatment, between contract
and no-contract periods.
9In 14 out of 1995 (57*35) cases, prices were chosen that yielded a negative production
quantity. These observations were left out of the descriptives tables and the data analysis
and had no e®ect on any of the conclusions made.
9¹ p1¡35 ¹ p26¡35
¯ = 0
T00 94.5 (18.9) 99.5 (23.5)
T01 103.1 (19.1) 106.5 (22.4)
T010 88.8 (10.7) 87.2 (8.6)
T011 111.0 (18.4) 114.9 (22.0)
¯ = 1
T10 93.5 (16.0) 96.6 (14.3)
T11 93.4 (18.7) 96.1 (19.6)
T110 86.9 (18.4) 85.5 (7.9)
T111 93.3 (19.4) 93.1 (23.3)
Table 2: Average prices and standard deviations
Note that for ¯ = 1 the average price in the contract treatment in periods
without R&D contracts is 85.5 and is 93.1 in periods with contracts and the
average price in the last ten periods of the contract treatment is 96.1, while we
would expect it to be somewhere between 85.5 and 93.1. This observation can
be explained by a combination of the following facts. First, prices of subjects
that always choose to commit to an R&D contract are quite high. Second,
prices of subjects that switch between committing and not committing to
a contract are generally higher when contracts are not committed to |but
not as high as prices of subjects that always commit| than when they are
committed to.
Having made their R&D decisions, the possibility exists that in the pricing
stage subjects get locked in local optima, since theoretical Nash and collusive
prices are expressed in terms of own and other ¯rm's R&D. It would thus be
misleading to compare prices in the experiment with the benchmark prices
presented in table 1 without taking into account the actual R&D decisions.
Instead, the experimental price in a certain period should be compared with
the benchmarks in equations 2 and 5, calculated on the basis of the R&D de-
cisions made in that period. As a consequence, for each combination of R&D
decisions, a separate set of Nash and collusive prices should be calculated.
Further, to avoid the inconvenience of having two di®erent benchmarks, i.e.
a Nash and a collusive price, experimental prices are transformed taking into
account Nash and collusive prices based on the experimental R&D decisions
into the following variable:
Pkt =
¹ pkt ¡ ¹ pNash
kt
¹ pCollude
kt ¡ ¹ pNash
kt
: (8)
the bar refers to averages of individual prices within duopoly k, t to the





















































































































































Figure 1: Evolution of average P
based on equation 2 and the collusive price based on equation 5 respectively.
Pkt measures the extent to which the average price of duopoly k in period t
is closer to its Nash or cooperative level. If the price is at the Nash level, Pkt
is equal to 0 and if the price is at the cooperative level, Pkt is equal to 1. For
a price situated between the Nash and the cooperative level, Pkt is between
0 and 1. The transformed variable has the additional advantage that price
decisions become comparable across spillover levels.
The evolution of average transformed prices is in ¯gure 1 and averages and
standard deviations of the transformed prices are in table 3. Note that for
convenience, we simply apply the notation P to indicate transformed prices.
Within the contract treatment, a further distinction is again made on the
basis of whether a contract has actually been chosen or not, which is again
represented by a third index. Thus, the left graph of the ¯gure represents
average prices of each treatment and the right graph represents averages of
prices within the contract treatments, where a distinction is made between
periods with and without R&D contracts.
In the table and the ¯gure it is observed that mostly, P is between 0 and
1 which implies that prices usually are above the Nash level and below the
cooperative level. Only in periods without R&D contracts in the contract
treatments, prices seem to be quite close to the Nash level. Further, stan-
dard deviations are quite high, which indicates that large di®erences exist in
individual pricing strategies. The most important observations are that, for
both spillover levels, average transformed prices in the contract treatments
are above prices in the baseline treatments. And within the contract treat-
11¹ P1¡35 ¹ P1¡10 ¹ P11¡25 ¹ P26¡35
¯ = 0
T00 0.21 (0.33) 0.11 (0.27) 0.22 (0.40) 0.28 (0.41)
T01 0.37 (0.32) 0.25 (0.25) 0.42 (0.39) 0.40 (0.39)
T010 0.12 (0.19) 0.12 (0.19) 0.19 (0.31) 0.06 (0.14)
T011 0.49 (0.33) 0.39 (0.24) 0.63 (0.34) 0.56 (0.37)
¯ = 1
T10 0.20 (0.30) 0.17 (0.30) 0.22 (0.33) 0.20 (0.31)
T11 0.36 (0.32) 0.32 (0.38) 0.37 (0.37) 0.39 (0.35)
T110 0.07 (0.34) -0.09 (0.12) 0.18 (0.37) -0.03 (0.18)
T111 0.41 (0.29) 0.45 (0.30) 0.40 (0.36) 0.43 (0.31)
Table 3: Average P and standard deviations
ments, transformed prices in periods in which contracts are committed to,
are above prices in no-contract periods. Another observation is that average
transformed prices often increase during the experiment and decline again at
the end of the experiment, which could be due to an end e®ect. From ¯gure
1 it becomes clear that also within each ¯ve periods with a constant R&D
decision, prices usually decline towards the ¯nal of the ¯ve periods.
Further, we test whether di®erences in (transformed) prices between treat-
ments and within the contract treatments are statistically signi¯cant. Results
of non-parametric tests are in table 4. The table should be interpreted as fol-
lows. Results of Mann-Whitney tests of di®erences between the treatments
without and with contract possibilities are under the header `Between' and
results of Wilcoxon signed ranks tests of di®erences within the contract treat-
ments between prices in contract and no-contract periods are under `Within'.
General results |i.e. results without distinguishing between the two levels of
technological spillovers| are presented, as well as separate results for both
spillover levels. The presentation of the general results is justi¯ed, since non-
parametric tests (of which the statistics are not presented here) do not ¯nd
signi¯cant di®erences in prices between ¯ = 0 and ¯ = 1. Consider ¯rst the
general results without distinguishing between the two spillover levels. The
Mann-Whitney statistics indicate that a signi¯cant di®erence in transformed
prices exists between the treatments without and with contract possibili-
ties, either with a 5% signi¯cance level for all and the ¯rst ten periods or
with a 10% signi¯cance level for the middle 15 and the last ten periods. More
speci¯cally, prices in contract treatments are higher than prices in treatments
without contract possibilities. The statistical signi¯cance is quite marginal,
which is further illustrated by the results of the between-tests for the sepa-
rate spillover levels. Indeed, when considering the results for each spillover
12Between Within
all ¯ = 0 ¯ = 1 all ¯ = 0 ¯ = 1
All periods
z -2.083 -1.502 -1.427 -3.841 -2.756 -2.701
exact sig. (2-tailed) 0.037 0.140 0.164 0.000 0.006 0.007
N 57 31 26 21 11 10
Periods 1-10
z -2.067 -1.660 -1.116 -2.366 -2.023 -1.342
exact sig. (2-tailed) 0.039 0.101 0.264 0.018 0.043 0.180
N 57 31 26 7 5 2
Periods 11-25
z -1.698 -1.304 -0.960 -2.599 -1.095 -2.201
exact sig. (2-tailed) 0.089 0.202 0.357 0.009 0.273 0.028
N 57 31 26 11 4 7
Periods 26-35
z -1.794 -1.186 -1.479 -2.547 -1.604 -1.992
exact sig. (2-tailed) 0.073 0.247 0.148 0.011 0.109 0.046
N 57 31 26 9 3 6
Table 4: Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon signed ranks test results for prices
level separately, the signi¯cance disappears if 2-tailed tests with a signi¯cance
level of 5% are relied on.
Further, from the table it becomes clear that taking into account whether
contracts have actually been committed to, within the contract treatments, is
important. Indeed prices in periods with R&D contracts are generally found
to be signi¯cantly higher than prices in periods without contracts, for the
whole period and for all sub-periods. When considering the spillover levels
separately, the signi¯cance in some of the sub-periods decreases, probably
because there are too few observations in these sub-periods. E.g. for ¯ = 0
only 3 observations underlay the Wilcoxon test in the last sub-period, imply-
ing that 3 out of 16 duopolies switched between choosing and not choosing
an R&D contract in the last sub-period.
To summarize, if no distinction is made between treatments with and
without technological spillovers such that all observations of the contract
treatments on the one hand and the treatments without contract possibili-
ties on the other hand, are taken together, transformed prices in the contract
treatments are found to be higher than prices in the treatments without con-
tract possibilities, with a statistical signi¯cance level of 5%. Beside this,
even stronger statistical evidence is found for a within-di®erence in the con-
tract treatments. I.e. prices in periods in which R&D contracts are actually
committed to, are higher than prices in periods without R&D contracts.
134.2 Econometric analysis
As to make ¯nal conclusions on the hypotheses regarding pricing and R&D
behavior, general transformed price levels (i.e. P) that are representative
for each treatment and within the contract treatment, for periods with and
without R&D contracts, should be found. We could use simple averages to
represent the general transformed prices, but then we would have to make
arbitrary choices on the periods to base the calculations on. Should all
periods be taken into account then, or only e.g. the last ten periods? Besides,
in the previous subsection it became clear that for some sub-periods, too
few observations were available to calculate averages that are representative
for price decisions (cfr. few duopolies switch between contracting and not
contracting in certain sub-periods). Another disadvantage of this approach
is that the dynamics and the time series character of the experimental data
are ignored. When using econometrics to calculate the long-term prices,
these problems are avoided (see also KÄ onigstein, 2000).
It is assumed that the price decision of each duopoly and in each period is
equal to the sum of a constant term and a duopoly- and time-speci¯c resid-
ual °uctuation that follows an autoregressive process of order 2. Dummies
that represent the spillover parameter, the treatment and the use of R&D
contracts are also included. As such, the long-run transformed prices of each
treatment are estimated, based on the following econometric equations10,
Pk;t = ¸0 + ¸1¯k + ¸2CONk + ¸3COMMk;t + uk;t (9)
uk;t = ½1uk;t¡1 + ½2uk;t¡2 + ²k;t: (10)
¯k represents the spillover parameter of duopoly k, CONk is a dummy that is
1 when duopoly k had contract possibilities (contract treatment) and 0 oth-
erwise and COMMkt is equal to 1 when within a contract treatment duopoly
k has committed to an R&D contract in period t and 0 otherwise. ²k;t follows
a white noise process. A parameter of CONk that is statistically di®erent
from zero, implies that transformed prices di®er in a statistically signi¯cant
way between treatments without and with contract possibilities. When the
parameter of COMMkt is statistically di®erent from zero, the transformed
price that is representative for the no-contract treatments and for periods
without R&D contracts in the contract treatments, di®ers in a statistically
signi¯cant way from the price in periods with contracts. Similarly, when the
parameter of ¯k is statistically signi¯cant, a di®erence in transformed prices
between the two spillover levels exists.
10The residual AR(2) process is stationary and converges if j½1j < 1, j½2j < 1, ½1+½2 < 1
and ½2 ¡ ½1 < 1 (Greene, 2000).
14parameter estimates (p-values)
(1) (2) (3)
1 0.227 (0.000) 0.227 (0.000) 0.180 (0.000)
¯k -0.104 (0.200) -0.104 (0.199) -
CONk -0.001 (0.993) - -
COMMk;t 0.170 (0.000) 0.170 (0.000) 0.168 (0.000)
uk;t¡1 0.809 (0.000) 0.809 (0.000) 0.810 (0.000)
uk;t¡2 0.093 (0.000) 0.093 (0.000) 0.093 (0.000)
R2 0.819 0.819 0.819
DW 1.922 1.922 1.921
Table 5: Econometric estimates
Results of pooled feasible GLS estimation of equations 9 and 10 are in
table 5. Estimates of the equations with all variables included, are in column
(1), estimates without the inclusion of CONk because of its insigni¯cance are
in (2), and estimates without CONk and ¯k are in (3). P-values of t-tests
with the null hypothesis that the parameter of the corresponding variable
is zero are in brackets. From column (1) in the table we learn that the
constant term, COMMkt and the autoregressive terms are highly signi¯cant.
The statistical insigni¯cance of CONk implies that prices in the treatments
without contract possibilities are not di®erent from prices in periods without
R&D contracts in the contract treatments. In the following estimations,
the variables that are found to be insigni¯cant in the ¯rst estimation are
gradually left out. In the second estimation, CONk is left out and in the
third estimation also ¯k is left out. Note that the parameter estimate that
corresponds to the spillover parameter has a negative sign, which implies
that transformed prices in the treatments with spillovers, are lower than
transformed prices in the treatments without spillovers. But since it is also
found to be not signi¯cant, we do not pay any further attention to this.
Looking at the results of the ¯nal estimation in column (3), we observe
that the constant term is 0.18 and highly signi¯cant. This constant term
represents the (general) long-run transformed price in the treatments without
R&D contract possibilities and in the contract treatments in periods where
no R&D contracts were actually committed to. Thus, prices generally are
above the Nash level. The estimate of the parameter of the dummy that is
one in periods where an R&D contract has been committed to (COMMkt) is
positive, which indicates that transformed prices are signi¯cantly higher in
periods in which contracts have been committed to, than in periods without
R&D contracts (in the contract and no-contract treatments). The long-run
transformed prices based on these estimations are in table 6 and are presented
15T (1) (2) (3)
T00 [ 0.09 , 0.36 ] [ 0.12 , 0.33 ]a [ 0.10 , 0.26 ]c
T010 [ 0.09 , 0.36 ] - -
T011 [ 0.26 , 0.53 ] [ 0.29 , 0.51 ] [ 0.25 , 0.44 ]d
T10 [ -0.02 , 0.27 ] [ 0.00 , 0.24 ]b -
T110 [ -0.02 , 0.26 ] - -
T111 [ 0.16 , 0.43 ] [ 0.17 , 0.41 ] -
aIncludes T010.
bIncludes T110.
cIncludes T010, T10 and T110.
dIncludes T111.
Table 6: 95% con¯dence intervals of long-run transformed prices
in the form of 95% con¯dence intervals. Thus with a 95% probability the
true long-run transformed prices will be in the intervals that are given in the
table.
First, it is con¯rmed in table 6 that transformed prices signi¯cantly dif-
fer from zero and one in most cases, implying that prices are mostly not
at the individual pro¯t maximizing, nor at the joint pro¯t maximizing level.
Thus, hypothesis 1 is generally rejected by the experimental data. In general,
conclusions on the comparison of (transformed) prices between treatments
without and with contract possibilities, and within the contract treatments,
between prices in periods without and with R&D contracts, are the same for
both levels of technological spillovers. Besides, we already found that no sig-
ni¯cant di®erence exists between prices with complete spillovers and prices
without spillovers. Transformed prices that are representative for treatments
without contract possibilities and for periods without R&D contracts in treat-
ments with contract possibilities, and for both spillover levels, are between
0.10 and 0.26, as can be read from table 6. Transformed prices in periods
with R&D contracts in the contract treatments generally are between 0.25
and 0.44, and thus signi¯cantly higher. To conclude this section, there ex-
ists strong evidence that committing to R&D contracts increases prices in
industries without and with full technological spillovers.
5 R&D decisions
In this section we focus on R&D behavior in the experiment. To get a
¯rst idea of the distribution of the experimental R&D decisions and the
possible presence of outliers in the data, we refer to the box plots in ¯gure
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Figure 2: Boxplot of R&D decisions
2. The boxes represent the inter quartile range of the data and the whiskers
represent the highest and lowest values excluding outliers. The dotted line
is the median. Outliers are de¯ned as observations that are between 1.5 and
3 box lengths from the upper and lower edge of the box. Table 7 gives R&D
decisions averaged over the whole experiment and the average of the last two
R&D decisions, which corresponds with the last ten periods. In the contract
treatments a distinction is made between average R&D decisions that are not
contracted (speci¯ed by T010 and T110) and average contracted R&D decisions
(speci¯ed by T011 and T111). Standard deviations are in brackets.
From the box plots we learn that R&D decisions without technological
spillovers are generally very similar in the treatments without and with con-
tract possibilities. The median is around 40 and thus lies somewhere between
the competitive R&D level when expecting price competition in the second
stage and the competitive R&D level when expecting price collusion. Another
interpretation could be that it lies between the cooperative and competitive
level, when price collusion is expected in the second stage. In table 7 a further
distinction is made between average not-contracted and average contracted
R&D decisions. Without spillovers, average contracted R&D decisions are
below average not-contracted R&D decisions. The box plots of the treat-
ments with spillovers show that R&D decisions of subjects having contract
possibilities are higher than decisions of subjects without contract possibili-
17¹ X1¡35 ¹ X26¡35
¯ = 0
T00 39.8 (5.0) 35.8 (6.7)
T01 40.2 (10.5) 35.0 (7.8)
T010 43.2 (10.0) 38.4 (5.0)
T011 36.1 (11.0) 34.3 (9.2)
¯ = 1
T10 21.3 (9.3) 17.1 (9.3)
T11 34.8 (9.7) 33.5 (8.4)
T110 21.2 (13.7) 15.4 (14.1)
T111 38.7 (9.4) 40.0 (11.8)
Table 7: Average duopoly R&D decisions and standard deviations
ties. With contract possibilities, R&D decisions de¯nitely overshoot any of
the benchmark R&D levels. Without contract possibilities, R&D decisions
are around 20, which is either the cooperative R&D level assuming price
competition in the second stage or between the competitive and cooperative
level assuming price collusion in the second stage. The distinction between
average not-contracted and average contracted R&D decisions, made in table
7, seems to matter especially for full spillovers. Average not-contracted R&D
decisions in the contract treatment are very close to average R&D decisions
in the baseline treatment. Average contracted R&D is much higher than
average not-contracted R&D.
Each of the contract treatments (T01 and T11) have an outlying duopoly
R&D decision. In T11, the outlier is duopoly 15 and its behavior is close
to competition in both stages. Behaviour of duopoly 12 in T01 is harder to
classify. We can only observe that the R&D decision of this duopoly is higher
than any of the benchmark levels.
Further, whether di®erences between treatments and within the contract
treatments are statistically signi¯cant, is tested in a series of non-parametric
tests. Within the contract treatments, di®erences in R&D behavior might
arise between subjects that have actually used contract possibilities and those
who have not, as table 7 showed. Expectations are that when contract pos-
sibilities are used, R&D levels are closer to the cooperative level. Results
of Wilcoxon signed ranks tests of di®erences between contracted and non-
contracted R&D decisions are in table 8 under the header `Within'. Results
of Mann-Whitney tests of di®erences between the no-contract and contract
treatments are under the header `Between'. Results are based on averages
that are calculated for all periods and the last sub-period, i.e. the last ten pe-
riods. In the last row of each of the sub-periods, the number of observations
18Between Within
¯ = 0 ¯ = 1 ¯ = 0 ¯ = 1
All periods
z -0.198a -2.984a -1.376a -2.701a
exact sig. (2-tailed) 0.861 0.002 0.193 0.004
N 31 26 11 10
Last 10 periods
z -0.753b -3.349a -1.089b -2.207a
exact sig. (2-tailed) 0.463 0.000 0.500 0.031
N 31 26 3 6
a based on X1 ¡ X0 < 0 where 1 is a dummy for contract.
b based on X1 ¡ X0 > 0.
Table 8: Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon signed ranks test results for R&D
on which the related tests are based, is given.
The tests indicate that without technological spillovers, R&D levels do
not di®er between treatments with and without contract possibilities, which
already could have been expected on the basis of the box plots and the de-
scriptives in table 7. Also within the contract treatment without spillovers, no
signi¯cant di®erence is found between contracted and non-contracted R&D
levels. With technological spillovers, the tests yield a signi¯cant di®erence
with signi¯cance levels of 5 or 1% between R&D levels in the two treatments
and within the contract treatment, except in the ¯rst ten periods. More
speci¯cally, R&D levels are found to be higher when contracts are allowed
compared to the baseline treatment. Furthermore, within the contract treat-
ment, R&D levels are higher in periods in which contracts are made than
in periods in which no contracts are made. This indicates that with high
spillovers subjects are more cooperative in the R&D stage when they com-
mit to an R&D contract, since cooperative R&D levels are above competitive
R&D levels when spillovers are high. Note that when the outliers (cfr. box
plots) are not taken into account in the tests, results are very similar.
The di®erence in results for the treatments with and without spillovers
can have di®erent causes. Do subjects sign less contracts without spillovers
compared to with spillovers? Or do they simply fail to contract cooperative
R&D levels? For this purpose, we tested whether the amount of chosen
contracts di®ers between both treatments using a Mann-Whitney test. This
test yields that, when all periods are taken into account, the amount of
chosen contracts is signi¯cantly higher in the spillovers treatment than in
the no-spillovers treatment. The corresponding p-value is 0.044. Leaving
out the outliers does not change the results. Thus, evidence exists that with
19complete spillovers, subjects commit more often to an R&D contract and are
also more cooperative in R&D compared to without spillovers.
Finally, it should be examined whether the experimental R&D decisions
coincide with the theoretical benchmarks. Di±culties arise, though, when
comparing R&D decisions in the experiment with the benchmarks without
taking into account pricing behavior. Let us make our point clear with an
example. In treatment T00 the average duopoly R&D decision lies around 39.
When comparing this ¯gure with the theoretical benchmarks in table 1, no
clear-cut conclusions on whether R&D is close to the cooperative or compet-
itive level can be made. If subjects expected prices to be somewhere between
the Nash and the cooperative level, we would say that R&D behavior in T00
is rather competitive, i.e. between 34.8 and 56.0. But if subjects expected
that the future price would be at its cooperative level, we would conclude
that R&D investment lies between the cooperative and the competitive level,
i.e. between 26.0 and 56.0. That is why when testing the hypotheses related
to R&D behavior of ¯rms, also price decisions have to be taken into account.
Based on the estimated long-run transformed prices and their con¯dence in-
tervals of the previous section, further conclusions on R&D behavior in the
¯rst stage can be made. If it is assumed that the subjects act in the R&D
stage taking into account their expected actions in the pricing stage and
that their expected price decisions correspond to their actual price decisions,
R&D behavior can indeed be identi¯ed.
It has been found in the previous section that prices are predominantly
not at the Nash or cooperative level, which is indicated by the estimated
long-run transformed prices (indicated by P) lying somewhere between 0
and 1, and not being equal to 0 or 1. This naturally complicates the analysis
of R&D decisions, since they cannot be simply compared to the theoreti-
cal benchmarks as presented in table 1 because these benchmarks are based
on the assumption of individual or joint pro¯t maximizing pricing behavior
in the second stage. Finding a range of R&D benchmarks, i.e. theoretical
competitive and cooperative R&D decisions, as a function of di®erent values
of P where 0 · P · 1, would allow us to compare the experimental R&D
decisions with the correct, corresponding R&D benchmarks. Setting up this
range of R&D benchmarks can be done by reinterpreting the pro¯t maxi-
mization problems in the second, i.e. the pricing, stage. More speci¯cally,
both second-stage individual and joint pro¯t maximization problems can be
uni¯ed into one modeling approach, which is the `coe±cient of cooperation'
approach (Martin, 1993, p. 30). In this approach, both ¯rms in a duopoly
maximize their own pro¯t and a fraction Á of the pro¯t of the competitor.
Total pro¯t to be maximized is then equal to ¼i+Á¼j for i;j = 1;2 and i 6= j.
If Á is equal to 0, individual pro¯t maximization results in the pricing stage
20and if Á is equal to 1, price collusion results. For any value of Á between 0
and 1, resulting prices are between the Nash and the collusive level, as is also
the case for P. It can be shown that under the assumption of symmetry, the
following relation exists between Á and P (see appendix B),
P =
2Á(b ¡ c)
2b ¡ c(Á + 1)
; (11)
where for any value of Á between 0 and 1, P is increasing and convex in
Á. Since it is possible to establish theoretical R&D benchmarks for R&D
competition and R&D cooperation, as a function of Á, i.e. by solving the
¯rst- and second-stage pro¯t maximization problems, it is also possible to
write them as a function of P. Figure 3 contains for both spillover levels
simulated curves of R&D benchmarks that represent the competitive and
cooperative R&D levels (displayed as X¤ and X¤¤ respectively) for di®erent
values of P. As to compare the experimental R&D decisions with these
theoretical benchmarks, averages of experimental R&D decisions11 (see also
table 7) are located in the graphs in the form of grey circles. Each of the
circles combines the estimated long-run transformed price on the horizontal
ax, i.e. the estimated P of a treatment (based on table 6), with the average
R&D decision in that treatment, on the vertical ax.
The location of the average R&D decision that represents R&D in the
treatment without spillovers and without contract possibilities and with con-
tract possibilities in periods without R&D contracts (represented by T00+T010
in ¯gure 3) suggests that R&D behavior is competitive. To be competitive,
average R&D should be between 37.4 and 42.012. Without spillovers and with
contract possibilities, in periods with R&D contracts (T011 in ¯gure 3), av-
erage R&D is somewhat below the competitive level and does not lie within
the competitive interval which is [41:1;45:6]. With spillovers and without
contract possibilities and in periods without R&D contracts in the contract
treatment (T10+T110 in ¯gure 3), the average R&D decision is located on the
curve representing R&D cooperation and lies within the cooperative interval,
i.e. between 20.0 and 23.2. R&D decisions in contract periods in the contract
treatment (T111 in ¯gure 3) de¯nitely overshoot the cooperative level.
At ¯rst sight, this overshooting might be hard to interpret, but it should
be remarked that this might be the consequence of how the model on which
11Average R&D decisions are used since there are too few observations in time on R&D
decisions to do an econometric analysis.
12These benchmarks are calculated taking into account the estimated con¯dence in-
tervals of the transformed price of table 6 and the re-interpretation of the second-stage
maximization problem, as previously explained. This goes for other benchmarks referred









































































































































































Figure 3: Simulations of competitive and cooperative R&D
the experiment is based, behaves. More speci¯cally, as we already mentioned
in section 3, the potential increase in pro¯t that results from leaving a com-
petitive R&D level for a cooperative R&D level is much smaller than the
potential increase in pro¯t that results from going from price competition
to price cooperation. So changes in price decisions e®ect pro¯ts more than
changes in R&D decisions, which is inherent to the underlying model. The
overshooting in the spillovers treatment on the one hand and the insignif-
icance of the di®erence in R&D decisions in the no-spillovers-treatment on
the other hand, should be interpreted in this context.
To summarize, without spillovers subjects compete in R&D if they do
not have R&D contract possibilities or if they do have contract possibilities
but do not use them. R&D levels that are between the competitive and the
cooperative one are chosen in periods where the contract possibilities are
used. With technological spillovers, subjects cooperate in R&D if no R&D
22contracts can be made and if they can be, but are not made. Contracted
R&D overshoots the cooperative level. Thus, hypothesis 2 is rejected for
the scenario with technological spillovers and not if no spillovers are present.
Hypothesis 3 is rejected for both spillover levels. But these results should be
interpreted with caution, since the sensitivity of pro¯ts with respect to R&D
decisions is much smaller than with respect to price decisions.
6 Welfare
Finally, we compare total welfare, i.e. the sum of consumer and producer
surplus, between and within the treatments. As consumer surplus is equal
to U(q1;q2) ¡ p1q1 ¡ p2q2 and producer surplus to ¼1 + ¼2, total welfare is
equal to the following expression









In table 9 averages of total welfare are given for the di®erent treatments
and for periods without and with R&D contracts within the contract treat-
ments. Without technological spillovers, welfare seems to be higher in the
treatment without contract possibilities compared to the treatment with con-
tract possibilities. Also, within the contract treatment, welfare in periods in
which no R&D contracts were made is higher than in periods with R&D
contracts. This highly corresponds to the conclusions based on the experi-
mental price decisions. Indeed, higher prices yield lower welfare than lower
prices, given that R&D decisions are constant. With technological spillovers,
these conclusions cannot be made. Welfare is slightly higher in the contract
treatment and in periods with R&D contracts than in the treatment with-
out contract possibilities and periods without R&D contracts in the contract
treatment respectively.
In table 10 results of statistical tests of di®erences in welfare between
and within treatments are presented. The structure of the table is the same
as the structure of similar tables in the previous subsections. These tests
con¯rm that without technological spillovers, welfare in periods with R&D
contracts is lower than welfare in periods without R&D contracts, within the
contract treatment. Between the contract and the no-contract treatment, the
di®erence in welfare fails to be statistically signi¯cant. With technological
spillovers, di®erences in welfare between and within the treatments are not
statistically signi¯cant at the 5% level. At the 10% level, welfare in the
¯nal 10 periods with R&D contracts is higher than welfare without R&D
contracts, within the contract treatment.
23¹ W1¡35 ¹ W26¡35
¯ = 0
T00 4563.2 (316.8) 4499.5 (415.4)
T01 4390.8 (330.9) 4364.8 (422.2)
T010 4646.2 (199.9) 4724.6 (137.6)
T011 4269.9 (333.7) 4209.9 (419.0)
¯ = 1
T10 4758.0 (313.9) 4666.1 (291.9)
T11 4848.7 (365.1) 4790.4 (353.7)
T110 4824.2 (429.8) 4778.1 (374.6)
T111 4886.2 (390.6) 4900.8 (453.3)
Table 9: Average welfare and standard deviations
Between Within
¯ = 0 ¯ = 1 ¯ = 0 ¯ = 1
All periods
z -1.621a -0.597b -2.934a -0.663b
sig. (2-tailed) 0.110 0.574 0.003 0.508
N 31 26 11 10
Last 10 periods
z -1.383a -0.960b -1.604a -1.786b
sig. (2-tailed) 0.175 0.357 0.109 0.075
N 31 26 3 6
a based on W1 ¡ W0 < 0 where 1 is a dummy
for contract.
b based on W1 ¡ W0 > 0.
Table 10: Mann-Whitney and Wilcoxon signed ranks test results for welfare
It is not that surprising, though, that welfare conclusions for the cases
with technological spillovers are di®erent from the cases without spillovers.
Indeed, as has been shown in the previous subsection on R&D decisions, in
the treatments without spillovers, no di®erences in R&D decisions have been
found between or within treatment(s). As such, the relation between prices
and welfare is quite straightforward, i.e. higher prices yield lower welfare.
With spillovers, such a straightforward link between prices and welfare cannot
be established, since R&D decisions in periods with R&D contracts (in the
contract treatment) have been found to be signi¯cantly higher than R&D
decisions in other periods and in the treatment without contract possibilities.
Since a higher R&D level yields higher welfare, given that prices are constant,
it is not surprising that welfare in periods with higher transformed prices
24and R&D contracts that contain high R&D levels is higher than or does not
signi¯cantly di®er from welfare in periods with lower transformed prices and
lower R&D levels.
7 Conclusion
In the paper we examined in an experiment whether in a duopoly framework
with technological spillovers, cooperation in R&D facilitates price collusion.
Subjects in the experiment were asked to make repeated R&D decisions in
a ¯rst stage and price decisions in a second stage. For two scenarios of tech-
nological spillovers, i.e. no spillovers versus complete spillovers, a treatment
without binding R&D contract possibilities and a treatment with contract
possibilities were run. A ¯rst ¯nding is that prices are almost never at the
subgame perfect Nash level, instead they are usually higher and lie between
the Nash and the collusive level. This is contrary to what theory predicts,
which is individual pro¯t maximization in the second stage, irrespective of
whether ¯rms have possibilities to commit to R&D contracts in the ¯rst
stage. In this context the question can be raised whether backward induc-
tion, which is the method of solving the two-stage model and necessary to
establish the theoretical predictions, is valid in the laboratory.
A second ¯nding is that if no technological spillovers are present, labora-
tory prices in periods in which R&D contracts were committed to, are higher
than prices in periods without R&D contracts. A fully collusive price level is
generally not reached, though. With complete spillovers, such a di®erence in
absolute price levels is not found. If it is taken into account that the theoret-
ical price predictions depend on the ¯rst-stage R&D decisions and prices are
normalized, it is found that also with spillovers, higher prices are gathered
when contracts are committed to.
Further, regarding the laboratory R&D decisions we ¯nd that without
technological spillovers and with contract possibilities, competitive levels
prevail in periods where no R&D contracts are committed to. Without con-
tract possibilities, R&D is somewhat lower and thus between the competitive
and the cooperative level. Contracted R&D levels in the contract treatment
are still lower and closer to the cooperative R&D level. With technological
spillovers, non-contracted R&D decisions |either in the treatment with or
without contract possibilities| are at the joint pro¯t maximizing level and
contracted R&D decisions overshoot the joint pro¯t maximizing level. Thus,
taking into account that cooperative R&D in industries without (with) tech-
nological spillovers is lower (higher) than competitive R&D, evidence exists
that the `natural' tendency to cooperate in R&D is higher with complete
25spillovers compared to without spillovers, which is a result that coincides
with Suetens (2003b).
As to provide some policy conclusions, it is important to take into ac-
count of how welfare is a®ected by the price and R&D decisions. Without
technological spillovers, it is clear that welfare in periods in which R&D con-
tracts are committed to is lower than in periods without contracts. With full
spillovers, no such di®erence in welfare exists. The reason is that |given
that R&D levels that are higher than theoretical competitive or cooperative
predictions, yield higher welfare| in contract periods, next to transformed
prices, R&D decisions are also higher, which reverses the negative e®ect of
high transformed prices on welfare. For governments that have recently been
lenient in their anti-trust legislation toward the formation of R&D agreements
and research joint ventures between ¯rms, the ¯ndings in the lab should pro-
vide a warning. Cooperative R&D agreements apparently can carry over to
the product market stage which can result in a decrease in welfare if there
exist no technological spillovers between the ¯rms.
26Appendix A: Transformed duopoly prices


























































































27Appendix B: The `coe±cient of cooperation'
approach
In the `coe±cient of cooperation' approach, a ¯rm maximizes its own pro¯t
and a part Á of the other ¯rm's pro¯t which coincides with the following




The price that solves this problem is
pi =
[2b + c(1 + Á)][a(b ¡ c) + ®(b ¡ cÁ)] ¡ ¢¢¢
4b2 ¡ c2(1 + Á)2
¡xi[2b2 + b¯c(1 ¡ Á) ¡ c2Á(1 + Á)] ¡ ¢¢¢
¡xj[2b2¯ + bc(1 ¡ Á) ¡ ¯c2Á(1 + Á)]
:
When Á = 0, pi is equal to the Nash price level that maximizes individual
pro¯t, called pNash
i and when Á = 1, pi is equal to the cooperative price level
that maximizes joint pro¯t, called pCollude
i .








Note that at this step prices need not necessarily be symmetric. The index i
in equation 13 refers to the ith ¯rm in the duopoly, while the indices k and
t in equation 8 referred to the duopoly and the period in the experiment.
Tranformed (experimental) prices in equation 8 are calculated on the basis
of per duopoly average prices. The ¯lling in of pi;pNash
i and pCollude
i in the
expression of Pi, and the assumption of symmetry in the ¯rst stage, i.e. xi =
xj, yields symmetric prices and the following expression for P = Pi = Pj,
P =
2Á(b ¡ c)
2b ¡ c(Á + 1)
;
where P is increasing and convex in Á for 0 < Á < 1.
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